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¶1 In mid-2003, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”), acting under congressional directives,1 joined 
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1 FCC Report and Order, In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone 
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forces to create, implement, and maintain a national do-not-call registry to limit the 104 
million telephone sales calls made to consumers each day.2  By revising the FTC 
Telemarketing Sales Rule (“TSR”)3 and amending the FCC rules that implement the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”),4 the agencies established the “Do-Not-
Call Registry” (“the Registry”), which prohibits telemarketers from calling phone 
numbers listed in the Registry.5 
¶2 However, both agencies permitted a number of exemptions for telemarketers.  This 
note examines the reasoning behind the “established business relationship” (“EBR”) 
exemption included in the revised TSR and TCPA rules and considers the potential 
challenges and consequences that may ensue.  Part I of this note discusses the legislative 
history of the recent amendments to the TSR and TCPA and provides an overview of the 
Registry and its key exemptions.  Part II examines the EBR exemption in detail and 
considers the shortcomings of the exemption within the context of wireless 
communication and facsimile devices.  Finally, Part III addresses the EBR exemption’s 
supporting arguments and contemplates the constitutional questions that ensue from a 
narrow reading of the EBR exemption. 
II. NO SOLICITATIONS: THE DO-NOT-CALL REGISTRY 
A. Legislative Background 
¶3 The FTC and FCC joint undertaking to create the Registry began in December 
2002 when the FTC announced that the federal government would maintain a national 
do-not-call registry, which telemarketers would fund by paying fees to access the 
database.6  Reacting to dramatic advances in telemarketing technologies since Congress 
enacted the TCPA in 1991 and the Telemarketing Act in 1994, the FTC amended its 
 
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 18 F.C.C. Rcd. 14014, 14018-14028 (2003) [hereinafter FCC Report 
and Order]. 
2 Id. at 14021. 
3 The Telemarketing Act of 1994 represented “congressional efforts to protect consumers against 
telemarketing fraud” and ordered the FTC “to issue a rule prohibiting deceptive and abusive telemarketing 
acts or practices.”  Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580 (Jan. 29, 2003) (to be codified at 16 
C.F.R. pt. 310).  The FTC issued the original Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR) in 1995, and officially 
amended the TSR on January 29, 2003.  Division of Marketing Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection, 
Federal Trade Commission, Complying with the Telemarketing Sales Rule, 4 (2003), at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/tsrcomp.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2004) [hereinafter 
Complying with the Telemarketing Sales Rule].  With some exceptions, the TSR “regulates 
‘telemarketing’—defined in the Rule as ‘a plan, program, or campaign . . . to induce the purchase of goods 
or services or a charitable contribution’ involving more than one interstate phone call.” Id. at 7. 
4 In an effort to curb “telemarketing practices thought to be an invasion of consumer privacy and even a 
risk to public safety,” Congress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA).  FCC 
Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14018.  The FCC adopted rules implementing the TCPA in 1992.  Id. at 
14018-14019.  On June 26, 2003, the FCC officially adopted revisions to the TCPA.  See generally id. at 
14014.  Although the FTC’s TSR covers interstate but not intrastate calls, FCC regulations apply to both 
types of calls.  Complying with the Telemarketing Sales Rule, supra note 3, at 7. 
5 Federal Trade Commission, FTC Facts for Business, Calling All Telemarketers: Amendments to the 
FTC’s Telemarketing Sales Rule 2 (March 2003) at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/calling.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2004) [hereinafter Calling 
All Telemarketers]; FCC Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14017. 
6 FCC Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14023.  See also Complying with the Telemarketing Sales 
Rule, supra note 3, at 38-40. 
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telephone sales rules “to better protect consumers from deceptive and abusive 
telemarketing practices, including those that may be abusive of consumers’ interest in 
protecting their own privacy.”7 
¶4 In March 2003, Congress passed the Do-Not-Call Act, which required the FCC to 
“maximize consistency” with the FTC do-not-call registry rules.8  Congress noted that, 
unlike the FTC, the FCC is bound by the TCPA.9  Thus, Congress recognized that 
identical rules may not be possible in every instance, but these instances must be noted 
and addressed by the agencies or legislation.10  Additionally, the FCC has broader 
jurisdiction over telemarketing practices than does the FTC.11  For example, without FCC 
collaboration, an FTC do-not-call registry would not include common carriers,12 airlines, 
insurance companies, and financial institutions.13 
¶5 On June 26, 2003, the FCC formally adopted revisions to the TCPA, which 
included establishing a national do-not-call registry.14  The next day, the FTC opened 
registration and allowed consumers to list their phone numbers in the Registry.15 
B. The Do-Not-Call Registry 
¶6 Under the rules that established the Registry, consumers may opt to register their 
phone numbers, and telemarketers, with some exceptions, may not call those numbers.16  
Recognizing that some consumers do not object to receiving sales calls, both the FTC and 
the FCC retained their requirements for telemarketers to maintain company-specific do-
not-call lists for those who do not opt to list their phone numbers in the Registry.17  These 
consumers may request individual companies to refrain from calling.18  Since its 
inception during the summer of 2003, the Registry has attracted the attention of millions 
of U.S. citizens; consumers registered over sixty-two million phone numbers as of June 
2004.19  The FTC began enforcing telemarketer compliance with the Registry on October 
1, 2003.20 
 
7 FCC Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14023.  See also id. at 14017-14032; Telemarketing Sales 
Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4580-4582. 
8 FCC Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14027; FCC Rules and Regulations Implementing the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) of 1991, 68 Fed. Reg. 44144, 44154 (July 25, 2003) (to be 
codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 64 and 68) [hereinafter FCC Rules and Regulations]. 
9 FCC Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14027. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Within the telecommunications industry, the term “common carriers” refers to telecommunication 
service providers. 
13 FCC Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14023. 
14 Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, FCC Authorizes National Do-Not-Call 
Registry (June 26, 2003), at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-235841A1.doc (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2004). 
15 Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, National Do Not Call Registry Opens (June 27, 2003), at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/06/donotcall.htm.  The registration process can be viewed at 
https://www.donotcall.gov/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2004). 
16 FCC Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14034-14049. 
17 Id. at 14018. 
18 Id. 
19 Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, National Do Not Call Registry Celebrates One-Year 
Anniversary (June 24, 2004), at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/06/dncanny.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2004). 
20 FCC Rules and Regulations, supra note 8, at 44144.  See also Calling All Telemarketers, supra note 
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¶7 Telemarketers, attempting to retain control over a practice that generates an 
estimated $600 billion annually,21 have challenged the Registry in the courts.  In U.S. 
Security v. FTC, decided in September 2003, several telemarketing companies and the 
Direct Marketing Association22 sought to enjoin the FTC from enforcing the Registry and 
other provisions of the revised TSR.23  Plaintiffs argued that 1) the FTC did not have an 
“unambiguous grant of authority by Congress” to establish the registry, and 2) the 
Registry “presents a serious or grave constitutional question.”24  Thus, argued the 
plaintiffs, “the FTC’s actions are entitled to no deference.”25  Finding for the plaintiffs, 
the U.S. District Court of the Western District of Oklahoma held that Congress had not 
authorized the FTC to establish a do-not-call registry.26 
¶8 However, within days of the U.S. Security decision, a unanimous Senate gave the 
FTC express authorization to implement the Registry, the House voted 412-8 in favor of 
authorization, and President Bush signed the legislation on September 29, 2003.27 
¶9 Just hours after this legislative boon for consumers, however, in FTC v. 
Mainstream Marketing Services, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado 
declared the national Do-Not-Call Registry unconstitutional and prohibited the FTC from 
implementing the Registry.28  But just days later, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
granted the FTC’s request to stay the district court’s order.29  The appellate court found a 
substantial government interest in “preventing abusive and coercive sales practices,”30 
and held that the FTC “established a likelihood of success on its contention that the do-
not-call list bears a reasonable fit with these interests.”31  On February 17, 2004, the 
Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order, and held that the Registry “is a valid 
commercial speech regulation because it directly advances the government’s important 
interests in safeguarding privacy and reducing the danger of telemarketing abuse without 
burdening an excessive amount of speech.”32  In October 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court 
rejected the telemarketers’ appeal and thus ended the legal challenges to the Registry.33 
 
5, at 2. 
21 FCC Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14021. 
22 Founded in 1917, the Direct Marketing Association (DMA) is the largest trade association for direct 
marketing businesses.  Direct Marketing Association, What is the Direct Marketing Association?, at 
http://www.the-dma.org/aboutdma/whatisthedma.shtml (last visited Nov. 19, 2004).  The DMA represents 
the interests of its 4700 member companies, which include consumer and business-to-business marketers, 
commercial and nonprofit marketers, companies that serve as vendors to marketers, and companies from 
the U.S. and fifty-three foreign nations.  Id. 
23 U.S. Security v. FTC, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1289 (W.D. Okla. 2003). 
24 Id. at 1290 (citing U.S. West v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir. 1999)). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 1292. 
27 Press Release, President Signs Do Not Call Registry (Sept. 29, 2003), at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030929-10.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2004). 
28 FTC v. Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc., 345 F.3d 850, 851 (10th Cir. 2003). 
29 Id. at 860. 
30 Id. at 855. 
31 Id.; see also id. at 860-861. 
32 Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228, 1233 (10th Cir. 2004).  For a concise 
summary of the legal history, see 10th Circuit Upholds Constitutionality of Do Not Call Registry, TECH 
LAW JOURNAL, Feb. 17, 2004, at http://www.techlawjournal.com/topstories/2004/20040217.asp (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2004). 
33 Robert S. Greenberger, High Court Won’t Revisit Damages, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2004, at A6. 
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¶10 Meanwhile, amidst the excitement and debate over the Do-Not-Call Registry, key 
components of the revised FTC and FCC rules that established the Registry have received 
little attention.  In revising the TSR and TCPA the agencies provided, in addition to the 
Registry, several commendable pro-consumer mandates for telemarketers.34  For 
example, in an effort to reduce the number of “hang-ups”35 and “dead air”36 calls that 
frustrate and frighten consumers, the FCC limited the abandoned call rate for automated 
telephone dialing equipment to three percent of calls answered by a person,37 and 
mandated that prerecorded information identifying the caller must accompany the 
abandoned call.38  Additionally, both the revised TSR and TCPA require telemarketers to 
transmit caller identification (“caller ID”) information, if available.39 
C. Exemptions from the Do-Not-Call Registry 
¶11 A number of exemptions permit certain types of unsolicited sales calls and 
unsolicited facsimile advertisements even if the called number is listed in the Registry.40    
1. Exemption for Tax-Exempt, Nonprofit Organizations 
¶12 The TCPA specifically excludes calls or messages by a tax-exempt nonprofit 
organization from the definition of telephone solicitations.41  In similar fashion, the TSR 
exempts charitable organizations.42  Arguably, unsolicited calls from nonprofit 
organizations create the same inconveniences as do unsolicited calls from for-profit 
 
34 See generally FCC Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14017-14018. 
35 Telemarketing operations often use automated telephone dialing technologies that dial telephone 
numbers at intervals based on calculations that predict when a sales representative will be available.  See 
FCC Rules and Regulations, supra note 8, at 44161.  An auto-dialer can immediately connect a sales 
representative to a new sales call when the system indicates that he or she has become available.  Although 
the calculations for agent availability rely on advanced statistical models, the calculations are, nonetheless, 
merely predictions.  Occasionally, the automated equipment dials a phone number and no sales 
representative is available.  The auto dialer disconnects the call when the consumer answers the phone.  
Although consumers widely refer to these calls as “hang-ups,” the FTC and the FCC refer to them as 
“abandoned calls.”  However, in a call center, an “abandoned call” is an inbound call in which a caller 
waiting on hold hangs up before speaking to an agent. 
36 Similarly, upon answering the phone, a consumer may be greeted with silence or “dead air” for 
several seconds while the automated dialing system connects the call to a sales representative.  The revised 
FTC and FCC rules consider a call abandoned if it is not transferred to a sales representative within two 
seconds of the called party’s greeting.  See id. at 44164; Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4641. 
37 The FTC prohibited abandoned calls altogether, but provided a “safe harbor” if the telemarketer 
meets certain requirements, such as abandoning no more than three percent of calls.  Telemarketing Sales 
Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4642.  The FCC established virtually the same rule for abandoned calls, but instead of 
banning all such calls and providing a “safe harbor,” it simply prohibited abandoning more than three 
percent of calls.  FCC Rules and Regulations, supra note 8, at 44164. 
38 FCC Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14017; Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4623. 
39 FCC Rules and Regulations, supra note 8, at 44166.  See also Complying with the Telemarketing 
Sales Rule, supra note 3, at 47.  Effective January 29, 2004, telemarketers may no longer block caller 
identification information.  Id. 
40 FCC Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14039-14046; Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 
4628-4638. 
 
 41 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3) (2004). 
42 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4637. 
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entities.43  However, legislative history, by emphasizing that “commercial calls constitute 
the bulk of all telemarketing calls,”44 seems to reveal congressional intent to exempt such 
calls.  Moreover, evidence suggests that “calls from nonprofit organizations are less 
intrusive to consumers because they are more expected.”45  Thus, Congress has reasoned 
that excluding calls from tax-exempt nonprofit organizations is “both rational and related 
to” protecting residential privacy.46  Calls from nonprofit organizations do not 
significantly contribute to the primary dilemma—sales calls that are unexpected and 
overwhelming in number.47 
2. Exemption for Personal Relationships 
¶13 The FCC’s personal relationship exemption permits unsolicited sales calls to 
individuals personally known to the caller.48  Presumptively, a sales call from a relative 
who sells Tupperware is more welcome and less frequent than calls from unknown 
businesses using predictive dialers and other call center technologies.49  However, the 
FCC declined to extend the personal relationship exemption beyond persons who know 
the caller.50  Thus, “referrals to persons that do not have a personal relationship with the 
marketer will not fall within the category of calls discussed above.”51 
¶14 The test for a personal relationship with the called party includes “whether a 
reasonable consumer would expect calls from such a person because they have a close or, 
at least, a firsthand relationship. . .[and] a strong presumption against those marketers 
who make more than a limited number of calls per day.”52  These criteria also reflect the 
reasoning behind the exemption for tax-exempt nonprofit organizations: the calls from 
these types of entities are more expected and less voluminous than random telemarketing 
solicitations.53 
¶15 It remains to be seen how the limited scope of this exemption will affect businesses 
that rely primarily on referrals.  The terms “network marketing,” or “relationship 
marketing,” are often used to describe referral-based business models.  Many of these 
business plans focus on home-based, independent-contractor situations that may provide 
extra sources of income for students and homemakers.54  Obtaining referrals expands the 
customer base beyond personal acquaintances and offers the incentive to provide high 
quality service to current customers. 
 
43 See id. 
44 FCC Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14044 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at 16 (1991)). 
45 Id. at 14055 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 102-317 at 16 (1991)). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 14045-14046. 
49 See id. at 14175 (Separate Statement of Commissioner Kathleen Q. Abernathy.  “I believe the record 
shows that Congress was concerned about anonymous calls using autodialers; it did not intend to put the 
Avon Lady out of business.  Consumers generally expect and welcome calls from family, friends, and 
acquaintances who want to promote products and services.  Restricting such calls therefore would impose a 
more extensive burden on speech than is necessary to achieve Congress’ goals.”). 




54 See, e.g., Michael L. Sheffield, Direct Sales vs. Network Marketing, ENTREPRENEUR.COM (May 19, 
2003) at http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/0,4621,308813,00.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2004). 
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¶16 The limited scope of the personal relationship exemption forces businesses to 
create new ways of building customer bases and developing business relationships.  
Undoubtedly, this places heavy burdens on some operations.  However, extending the 
personal relationship exemption to include third-party referrals would open the door for 
abuse of the exemption.  Large telemarketing operations could easily use vague 
relationship chains to dramatically increase their number of permitted sales calls. 
¶17 Unlike the FCC, in amending the TSR the FTC did not include a personal 
relationship exemption.55  Instead it indicated that it “does not contemplate enforcing the 
National Do Not Call Registry provisions against individuals who make sales calls out of 
their own homes to personal friends, family members, or small numbers of personal 
referrals.”56  The FCC’s personal relationship exemption more effectively addresses the 
desire to permit sales calls from family or friends by expressly exempting such calls, 
rather than simply stating that it will not enforce the rules in certain situations.  However, 
the conflict between the FCC rule and the questionable FTC policy on personal 
relationship sales calls poses a problem only in the case of interstate calls since the FCC 
exemption covers interstate calls.57  And, as the FTC anticipates, most sales calls made by 
friends and family members “probably would be local or ‘intrastate’ calls.”58 
3. Miscellaneous Exemptions 
¶18 The FCC’s Prior Express Permission exemption permits sellers to call consumers 
who have previously authorized them to do so.59  The FTC similarly permits a 
telemarketer to call a phone number listed on the Registry if the consumer has provided 
the telemarketer with express written permission.60 
¶19 Additionally, the statutory definition of “telephone solicitation” does not include 
calls made for market or survey research, or political or religious speech calls.61  As these 
calls would not be considered “unsolicited,” “sales calls,” or “advertisements,” these 
exclusions are not within the scope of this note and will not be discussed in detail.62 
¶20 As discussed, the exemptions for tax-exempt, nonprofit organizations and personal 
relationships offer balanced solutions that limit the number of intrusive sales calls but do 
not prohibit the types of sales calls that consumers would be more likely to expect or 
welcome.  However, as discussed in the next section, the Established Business 
Relationship exemption disrupts this balance and tips the scales in favor of the 
telemarketer. 
 
55 Although Congress indicated that the FCC and FTC must “maximize consistency” in their telesales 
rules, it did not require the agencies to have identical rules.  FCC Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14027; 
FCC Rules and Regulations, supra note 8, at 44144; see discussion infra pp. 3-4. 
56 Complying with the Telemarketing Sales Rule, supra note 3, at 41. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 FCC Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14043-14044. 
60 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4629. 
61 FCC Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14040. 
62 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3)(2004); FCC Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14039-14040. 
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III. THE REVISED ESTABLISHED BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP EXEMPTION 
A. What and Why 
¶21 The TCPA rules previously defined the “established business relationship” as: 
a prior or existing relationship formed by a voluntary two-way 
communication between a person or entity and a residential subscriber 
with or without an exchange of consideration, on the basis of an inquiry, 
application, purchase or transaction by the residential subscriber regarding 
products or services offered by such person or entity, which relationship 
has not been previously terminated by either party.63 
¶22 The FCC Order amended the TCPA’s definition of an established business 
relationship and defined it as: 
a prior or existing relationship formed by a voluntary two-way 
communication between a person or entity and a residential subscriber 
with or without an exchange of consideration, on the basis of the 
subscriber’s purchase or transaction with the entity within the eighteen 
(18) months immediately preceding the date of the telephone call or on the 
basis of the subscriber’s inquiry or application regarding products or 
services offered by the entity within the three (3) months immediately 
preceding the date of the call, which relationship has not been previously 
terminated by either party.64 
¶23 The FCC created this exemption from the Registry because it acknowledged that 
sellers should have the ability to contact their existing customers, and such customer 
contact “is an important aspect of [a seller’s] business plan and often provides consumers 
with valuable information regarding products or services that they may have purchased 
from the company.”65  Additionally, consumers who had previously done business with a 
company “could expect to receive a call from [that entity] in an effort to ‘win back’ or 
‘renew’ that consumer’s business within 18 months.”66 
¶24 In revising the TSR, the FTC included a similar Established Business Relationship 
exemption, although the proposed rule had not included such an exception.  Initially, the 
FTC sought to limit “exemptions in order to provide consumers with the most 
comprehensive privacy protection possible.”67  However, telemarketers strongly 
advocated including an exemption for established business relationships and persuaded 
the FTC that the “benefits of including [the exemption] outweigh the costs.”68 
¶25 Both the FCC and the FTC rely on the sufficiency of company-specific do-not-call 
lists: if consumers do not wish to receive unsolicited sales calls from parties with whom 
 
63 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(4)(2004). 
64 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(3)(2004). 
65 FCC Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14043. 
66 Id. at 14080. 
67 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4633. 
68 Id. at 4634. 
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they have an established business relationship, they may notify the callers prior to or 
during the sales calls.69  The businesses must maintain a record, such as a company-
specific do-not-call list, of these requests and refrain from calling again.70 
B. Practical Problems with the EBR Exemption 
¶26 The average consumer has a daunting number of established business relationships.  
These include relationships with multiple banks, credit card companies, insurance 
companies, investment brokers, phone companies, cable companies, internet service 
providers, utilities, magazine publishers, hotels, airlines, and travel agencies.  They 
include relationships established when ordering items from catalogs, filling out contact 
information when using coupons, entering a drawing or sweepstakes, submitting 
information for a product warranty, and inquiring about a product or service.71  Today, 
nearly every business entity that consumers encounter records purchase and/or contact 
information. 
¶27 While the EBR exemption merely inconveniences residential landline72 customers, 
it heightens financial, safety, and privacy concerns when extended to mobile devices or 
other communication tools for which consumers bear a burden of cost for each 
advertisement or sales call received.73 
1. Applicability to Wireless Numbers 
¶28 Markedly, neither the TCPA nor the FCC expressly states whether the EBR 
exemption applies to wireless devices.74  The FCC makes clear that it has not prohibited 
“all live telephone solicitations to wireless numbers.”75  However, the TCPA does not 
permit live sales calls to wireless numbers using automated dialing equipment,76 nor does 
it permit calls to wireless numbers using artificial voice technologies or prerecorded 
messages.77  Moreover, the Direct Marketing Association (“DMA”) urges its members to 
refrain from making any type of unsolicited sales calls to any wireless number, even if 
this mandate “go[es] beyond federal law.”78 
 
69 FCC Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14043. 
70 Id. 
71 The FTC cautions consumers to “carefully read any questionnaires or surveys you submit; they may 
be an attempt to establish a business relationship.  Also be careful to read anything you sign, such as 
sweepstakes forms or requests for ‘free’ products; they may be attempts to get your written permission.”  
Federal Trade Commission, FTC Facts for Consumers, You Make the Call: The FTC’s New Telemarketing 
Sales Rule 2 (Dec. 2003), at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/tmarkg/donotcall.pdf (last visited Nov. 
19, 2004) [hereinafter You Make the Call]. 
72 “Landline” or “wireline” phones are traditional telephone lines. 
73 E.g., wireless phones and fax machines. 
74 Direct Marketing Association, Marketing Mistakes: Reaching Wireless Devices, at http://www.the-
dma.org/guidelines/wirelessmarketing.shtml (last visited Nov. 19, 2004). 
75 FCC Rules and Regulations, supra note 8, at 44165. 
76 Id. 
77 Id.  As the FCC expressly states, “Both the [TCPA] and our rules prohibit these calls, with limited 
exceptions, ‘to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized 
mobile radio service, or other common carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged.’  
47. U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)(2004).  This encompasses both voice calls and text calls to wireless numbers.”  
Id. 
78 Direct Marketing Association, supra note 74. 
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¶29 However, it seems likely that if the FCC had meant to limit the EBR exemption to 
landline phones, it would have expressly done so.  The FCC has avoided “unduly 
restrict[ing] telemarketers’ ability to contact those consumers who do not object to 
receiving telemarketing calls and use their wireless phones as either their primary or only 
phone”79 by not restricting all sales calls to wireless numbers.80  Rather, the FCC states 
that listing wireless numbers in the Registry or relying on company-specific do-not-call 
lists should suffice to limit burdensome sales calls.81 
¶30 Additionally, in allowing wireless consumers to list their numbers in the Registry, 
the FCC found that defining “residential subscribers” as “telephone service used 
primarily for communications in the subscriber’s residence” too narrowly construes 
congressional intent to protect telephone customers.82  The FCC reasons that if “Congress 
had intended to exclude wireless subscribers from the benefits of the TCPA, it knew how 
to address wireless services or consumers explicitly.”83  Similarly, if the FCC had wished 
to eliminate the EBR exemption for wireless devices, it seems likely that it 
unambiguously would have done so. 
¶31 Assuming that the EBR exemption is applicable to wireless devices, several 
arguments support making the EBR exemption inapplicable.  Historically, more stringent 
rules have applied for unsolicited calls made to wireless devices.  Congress, by means of 
statute, “has indicated its intent to provide significant protections under the TCPA to 
wireless users.”84  As discussed, the TCPA prohibits calls made by automatic dialing 
systems and calls with prerecorded messages to any wireless phone number, or to any 
device “for which the called party is charged for the call.”85 
¶32 In justifying its ban on all auto-dial and prerecorded calls to wireless numbers, the 
FCC noted that automated dialing systems or prerecorded calls pose a “greater nuisance 
and invasion of privacy than live solicitation calls”86 and stated that “such calls can be 
costly and inconvenient,”87 yet declined to issue a blanket prohibition of live unsolicited 
sales calls to wireless devices.88  However, it remains debatable whether auto-dialed89 or 
prerecorded calls are more intrusive than unexpected sales calls made by a live agent; 
indeed, a live agent has the potential to be even more aggressive or demanding than a 
prerecorded message. 
 
79 FCC Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14116. 
80 FCC Rules and Regulations, supra note 8, at 44165. 
81 Id. 
82 FCC Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14037-14038. 
83 Id. at 14038. 
84 Id. at 14037-14038 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(iii)). 
85 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1).  Absent any prior express request from the called party that the business entity 
refrain from calling, but subject to certain identification and abandoned call criteria, automatic dialing 
systems may be used to call landline numbers.  FCC Report and Order, supra note 1 at 14101-14110.  
Similarly, prerecorded calls from entities with whom the called party has an EBR are also permitted to 
landline numbers.  Id. at 14108-14109. 
86 FCC Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14115. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 14116. 
89 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) defines the term “automatic telephone dialing system” as “equipment which 
has the capacity A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential 
number generator; and B) to dial such numbers.” 
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¶33 Moreover, regardless of whether the call is dialed by an automatic system or by an 
agent who manually dials the phone number, both types of calls are costly and 
inconvenient to the wireless phone customer.  Some telemarketers have argued that, in 
some cases, “the incremental cost of receiving a cell phone call is not significantly 
different from the cost of receiving a non-cellular call.”90  But, as consumer groups and 
the FCC agree, “telemarketers have no way to determine how consumers are charged for 
their wireless service.”91  Furthermore, consumers with wireless plans that charge a fixed 
rate for an allotted number of minutes still bear the cost of sales calls that use a portion of 
the allotted minutes.92  As the FCC acknowledged, these minutes “could be exceeded 
more quickly if consumers receive numerous unwanted telemarketing calls.”93 
2. Facsimile Advertisements  
¶34 The regulation of unsolicited advertisements to fax machines should correspond to 
the regulation of unsolicited sales calls to wireless devices.94  Incurring time-based 
charges for usage is directly analogous to the fax context:95 “just as unsolicited faxes 
impose the unavoidable and objectively measurable costs of paper and ink on the 
recipient, so too do unsolicited”96 calls to wireless devices for which subscribers incur 
monetary costs, or pay via loss of allotted usage time.  Thus, in both instances, consumers 
bear the burden of the cost of the call.  Similarly, faxed advertisements and sales calls to 
wireless devices pose greater threats of inconvenience to the recipients than do 
telemarketing calls to non-mobile landline phones. 
¶35 The TCPA prohibits faxing any unsolicited advertisement to a fax machine97 
without obtaining prior express permission in writing with the recipient’s signature.98  
The FCC’s recent amendments to the TCPA reversed the prior rule, which had permitted 
an entity to fax unsolicited advertisements to recipients with whom the entity had an 
established business relationship.99  The revised rule states that an established business 
relationship alone is no longer sufficient, nor does an “opt-out”100 scheme provide 
adequate permission.101  Effectively, the recipient must “opt-in” and agree to receive fax 
advertisements by giving prior written consent.102  As the FCC notes, “[U]nlike the do-
not-call list for telemarketing calls, Congress provided no mechanism for opting out of 
unwanted facsimile advertisements.  Such an opt-out list would require the recipient to 
 
90 FCC Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14114. 
91 FCC Rules and Regulations, supra note 8, at 44165. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Michael W. Carroll, Garbage In: Emerging Media and Regulation of Unsolicited Commercial 
Solicitations, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 233, 277 (1996). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(2)(c). 
98 FCC Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14126. 
99 Id. at 14127. 
100 “Opt-out” schemes imply consent by presumption unless the recipient gives other instructions.  Id. at 
14127-30. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 14128. 
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possibly bear the cost of the initial facsimile and inappropriately place the burden on the 
recipient to contact the sender.”103 
3. Differences between Wireless and Facsimile 
¶36 Prior to the Order, the established business relationship had no limits of duration.104  
Recognizing that consumers felt frustrated and confused by numerous sales calls from 
companies with whom they had not done business in years, and also striving to reconcile 
rules with those of the FTC when possible, the FCC adopted the 18-month limit for the 
EBR exemption.105 
¶37 However, on August 18, 2003, the FCC extended the effective date to January 1, 
2005, for the “determination that an established business relationship will no longer be 
sufficient to show that an individual or business has given express permission to receive 
unsolicited facsimile advertisements.”106  A number of organizations indicated that they 
needed time to secure written permission from current recipients of their faxed 
advertisements.107  Then, in order to permit sufficient time to consider petitions for 
reconsideration,108 on September 26, 2003 the FCC stayed, “for an interim period, the 
limitations imposed. . . on the duration of an established business relationship as applied 
to the sending of unsolicited facsimile advertisements.”109  The FCC noted that the 
Order’s definition of the established business relationship was chiefly limited to 
telephone, not facsimile, solicitations.110 
¶38 Nonetheless, there are key similarities in the reasoning behind the FCC’s revision 
to the EBR exemption for faxed advertisements and the argument that the EBR 
exemption should be inapplicable to wireless numbers.  Moreover, the differences 
between fax machines and wireless devices justify additional measures of protection for 
wireless users.  The need for these measures supercedes the arguments for staying the 
EBR exemption rules for faxed advertisements. 
¶39 First, unsolicited sales calls are “intrinsically more invasive of privacy” than other 
unsolicited messages111 because “a junk call requires an immediate response.”112  Second, 
the very nature of mobile communication technologies makes unsolicited sales calls to 
these devices more intrusive, inconvenient, and dangerous than similar calls made to 
stationary, landline residential phones.113 Thus, whereas an unsolicited fax advertisement 
inconveniences the consumer and forces the consumer to bear the associated costs, an 
unsolicited sales call to wireless devices impose on the consumer the same cost burden, 
but additionally pose safety risks and greater inconveniences. 
 
103 Id. 
104 See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(4). 
105 FCC Rules and Regulations, supra note 8, at 44158. 
106 FCC Order, 2003 WL 21961003 (Aug. 18, 2003). 
107 Id. 
108 FCC Order, 2003 FCC Lexis 5369, 3 (Oct. 3, 2003). 
109 Id. at 1. 
110 Id. at 4. 
111 Carroll, supra note 94, at 246. 
112 Id.  
113 See FCC Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14116. 
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¶40 The majority of consumer groups who responded to the FCC’s Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking advocated prohibiting all telemarketing calls to wireless numbers.114  
Reasoning that making telemarketing calls to wireless phones is not a widespread 
practice at this time, the FCC ruled that the Registry would sufficiently limit the number 
of unsolicited sales calls made to wireless phones.115  But, as discussed next, this policy 
does not adequately reflect changes in the marketplace that seem likely to increase the 
number of sales calls to wireless devices. 
4. Potential Changes to the Wireless Market 
¶41  Relying on company-specific do-not-call lists as the sole means of managing 
EBR-exempted telemarketing calls to wireless numbers forces the consumer to pay the 
cost of each initial call.  As noted previously, the number of initial calls from each entity 
with whom a consumer has an established business relationship could be staggering.  
Furthermore, even if telemarketing to wireless phones is not currently a widespread 
practice, telemarketing calls to wireless phones will undoubtedly become more frequent 
due to the November 24, 2003 implementation of the FCC’s local number portability 
rule.116  This rule allows customers to retain their phone number if they change wireless 
service providers or switch their local exchange carrier to a wireless provider.117 
¶42 The FCC estimated initially that “six million customers may ‘port’ their landline 
number to their cellular phone within the first week alone.”118  However, although 
customers had ported 3.5 million numbers as of May 2004, most of these changes 
involved switching from one wireless carrier to another.119 
¶43 This does not suggest that the wireless and landline markets will not change 
dramatically in the near future.  On May 24, 2004, the number portability requirements, 
which had previously applied to telecommunications markets in the 100 largest U.S. 
cities, expanded to cover the entire country.120  Moreover, a recent study conducted by a 
telephone service provider indicates “that more than sixteen percent of Local Exchange 
Carriers’ residential customers would definitely or probably ‘port’ their landline number 
to a cellular provider.”121  As customers edge toward relying primarily on wireless 
devices, the FCC notes that, due to the rules that have for over twelve years prohibited 
telemarketers from making calls to wireless devices by means of automatic dialing 
 
114 Id. at 14114. 
115 Id. at 14113. 
116 Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, Statement of Commissioner Kathleen Q. 
Abernathy On the Implementation of Wireless Local Number Portability (Nov. 24, 2003), at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-241537A1.doc (last visited Nov. 19, 2004). 
117 Id. 
118 Direct Marketing Association, Number Portability Could Mean Lawsuits for Marketers, at 
http://www.the-dma.org/cgi/dispnewsstand?article=1660 (last visited Nov. 30, 2003). 
119 Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, FCC Chairman Powell: Another 70 Million 
Americans to Have Freedom to Switch Wireless Carriers and Keep Their Phone Number on Monday (May 
21, 2004), at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-247463A1.doc (last visited Nov. 19, 
2004). 
120 Id. 
121 Direct Marketing Association, supra note 118. 
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systems and prerecorded messages, telemarketers have developed technologies that 
identify wireless numbers.122 
¶44 Eliminating the EBR exemption from wireless and fax communications devices 
would not, by any means, prohibit consumers from receiving sales or advertising 
information.  Willing wireless or fax consumers may refrain from listing their numbers in 
the Registry, or may give businesses express written permission to fax advertisements or 
place sales calls to their wireless devices.  Nonetheless, telemarketers undoubtedly will 
oppose the views advanced in this section by raising constitutional questions.  The 
following section discusses the primary countering arguments. 
¶45  
IV. DEFENDING THE INDEFENSIBLE? ADDRESSING THE OPPOSING ARGUMENTS    
A. Constitutional Issues 
¶46 Certainly, constitutional questions arise if the EBR exemption applies to landline 
calls only.  The logical argument begins with the First Amendment, which decrees, 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”123  The Court extends 
the First Amendment provisions to commercial speech, but subjects it to a three-prong 
test, as outlined in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission 
of New York.124  In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court defined commercial speech as an 
“expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”125  
Under the Central Hudson criteria,126 the courts must assess whether the government has 
a substantial interest in prohibiting businesses from making unwanted sales calls to 
wireless numbers, whether the prohibition directly advances the government interest, and 
whether the prohibition is narrowly-tailored for advancing that interest.127 
1. Substantial Government Interest 
¶47 The government has substantial interests in prohibiting unwanted telemarketing 
efforts where consumers bear the burden of the cost of the call.  The primary interest in 
regulating telemarketing calls is the protection of individual privacy in the home.128  
Because “consumers lose an estimated $40 billion each year due to telemarketing fraud,” 
 
122 FCC Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14116. 
123 Scot M. Graydon, Much Ado About Spam: Unsolicited Advertising, The Internet, and You, 32 St. 
MARY’S L.J. 77, 90 (2000) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. I). 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 92 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980)). 
126 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S at 566.  This landmark case established the factors used to determine the 
scope of First Amendment provisions for commercial speech.  The Court must ask whether the speech 
concerns lawful activity and is not misleading, “whether the asserted government interest is 
substantial,. . .whether the regulation directly advances the government interest asserted, and whether it is 
not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”  Id.  The case involved a complete ban on 
“promotional advertising by an electrical utility.”  Id. at 558.  The Court found that completely prohibiting 
such advertising was a measure more extensive than necessary because it suppressed speech that did not 
impair the government interest in energy conservation.  Id. at 570-572. 
127 See id. at 566. 
128 Carroll, supra note 94, at 271. 
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Congress “authorized the FTC to prohibit sales calls that a reasonable consumer would 
consider coercive or abusive to his or her right to privacy.”129  The Supreme Court has 
“held that individuals are not required to welcome unwanted speech into their homes and 
the government may protect this freedom,”130 and that the right of individuals to be left 
alone in the privacy of their homes “plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of the 
intruder.”131 
¶48 Second, in justifying its efforts to curb telemarketing practices, the FCC noted, 
“Consumers often feel frightened, threatened, and harassed by telemarketing calls.  They 
are angered by hang-ups and “dead air” calls, by do-not-call requests that are not 
honored, and by unsolicited fax advertisements.”132  These consumer concerns are 
heightened when intrusive, unsolicited sales calls or advertisements are made to wireless 
phones or fax lines.   Third, consumers pay for each call to these devices, by forfeiting 
minutes from a pool of allotted usage minutes, or by suffering actual monetary losses, 
such as maintenance costs for fax machines, or per-call charges for wireless services.133  
A call to a wireless number from an entity with whom the customer has an established 
business relationship is just as costly as random sales calls made to the same wireless 
number. 
¶49 Fourth, as discussed, calls to mobile, wireless devices pose greater safety concerns 
than do calls made to stationary landline devices.  Many wireless customers pay for these 
services in order to receive vital calls.  Thus, simply turning off the ringer or choosing not 
to answer an incoming call may not be a desirable option, even if taking the call 
inconveniences the recipient. 
2. Directly Advances Government Interest  
¶50 Rendering the EBR exemption inapplicable to wireless numbers directly advances 
the government interests discussed above.  By listing their wireless numbers in the 
Registry, consumers have indicated that they do not wish to receive unsolicited sales 
calls.  However, the EBR exemption permits a number of unwanted sales calls.  These 
calls may occasionally inconvenience the landline customer; for the wireless customer, 
these calls become not only an inconvenience but an expense.  Thus, making the EBR 
exemption inapplicable to wireless devices is an effective measure for protecting the 
consumer’s privacy and financial interests.     
3. No More Extensive than Necessary 
¶51 A government determination that a mode of communication should be completely 
free from unwanted commercial solicitations is permissible “if necessary to avoid unfair 
cost-shifting.”134  Nonetheless, the FCC permits business entities with whom called 
parties have an established business relationship to call landline numbers, obtain 
 
129 Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228, 1235 (10th Cir. 2004). 
130 FCC Rules and Regulations, supra note 8, at 44152 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 
(1988)). 
131 Id. (citing FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978)). 
132 FCC Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14017. 
133 See Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995). 
134 Carroll, supra note 94, at 277. 
Vol. 3:1] Shannon D. Torgerson 
  39 
customer consent to call wireless numbers, or reach their customers via other modes, 
such as e-mail or regular mail.  The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that the 
Central Hudson test for measures “no more extensive than necessary” requires the 
absolute least-restrictive means.135  Rather, the regulation must be a reasonable fit.136 
¶52 Prohibiting the EBR exemption within the wireless context is a narrowly-tailored, 
reasonable means for meeting the government’s interest in protecting wireless subscribers 
from the burden and inconvenience of unwanted telemarketing efforts.  Neither the 
TCPA nor the TSR prohibit, per se, sales calls to wireless phones.  Consumers who wish 
to receive these calls may do so by opting not to list their numbers in the Registry.  
Limiting the EBR exemption to landline calls or calls to devices for which the recipient 
does not bear the burden of cost merely ensures that consumers do not receive sales calls 
that they must pay for, absent an express declaration of desire to receive such calls. 
¶53 Nothing precludes businesses from making sales calls to their customers who have 
given express permission.  Obviously, an entity who calls a customer with whom a 
business relationship has been established has acquired that customer’s contact 
information.  In acquiring such information, it is not unduly burdensome to also ask for a 
customer’s affirmative consent to receive occasional sales offers at the number provided, 
even if such number is associated with a wireless device. 
¶54 Establishing this new policy may impose costs on businesses that must obtain, via 
mail or e-mail, consent from current customers.  Nonetheless, telemarketers—not the 
recipients—should bear the costs associated with telephone sales pitches.  However, 
opponents of the Registry could argue that requiring businesses to obtain customers’ 
consent represents yet another economic blow to telemarketers.  The discussion below 
outlines some of the general economic arguments raised by Registry challengers. 
B. Economic Concerns 
¶55 Telemarketers concerned with economic effects of the Registry have focused little 
attention on the potential losses that would result from prohibiting unsolicited sales calls 
to wireless devices.  Likely, although the majority of sales calls currently are made to 
traditional landline phones, a ban on such calls to wireless devices would be perceived as 
yet another Registry-related economic blow. 
¶56 As noted earlier, some data suggest that the telemarketing industry generates as 
much as $600 billion annually.137  However, other figures indicate that the number is 
considerably lower.  The Direct Marketing Association estimates that four million 
telemarketers generate about $100 billion in revenue each year.138  To explain the 
discrepancies, privacy advocates and the Bureau of Labor Statistics indicate that 
telemarketers, in decrying the Registry’s potential adverse affects on the industry, may be 
grossly overstating revenue and employment figures.139  For example, the Registry does 
 
135 Bd. of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989). 
136 Id. at 470. 
137 FCC Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14021. 
138 Jeffrey Milberg, There’s No Call to Celebrate the Telemarketer Registry, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 
5, 2003, at M5. 
139 Wells Tower, Making the Call, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2004, at W12. 
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not affect inbound calls from consumers, which account for a significant portion of 
telemarketing transactions.140 
¶57 Nonetheless, some telemarketers anticipate layoffs and losses in sales.  Many 
businesses would agree with the telemarketer who touted the Registry as a “work-to-
welfare program.”141  However, not all telemarketers foresee such dire consequences; in 
fact, some telemarketers welcome the Registry.  “We absolutely will not have to lay off 
anyone,” stated Tom Cardella, the CEO of a Florida-based telemarketing firm with 
12,000 employees.142  “We are huge proponents of the list.  It’s good for business and 
great for consumers.  We don’t want to speak to people who don’t want to be spoken 
to.”143  In upholding the Registry, the Tenth Circuit agreed that the Registry can benefit 
telemarketers by allowing them to focus their efforts on those who do not object to 
receiving unsolicited commercial calls.144 
¶58 On March 26, 2004, WorldCom, Inc., citing the Registry and “ongoing telecom 
market trends,” announced that it will lay off 4000 employees and close three 
telemarketing call centers.145  Although telemarketers expect that WorldCom’s workforce 
reduction is the first of many large layoffs to come, financial analysts disagree that the 
Registry is the driving force behind the cutbacks.146  Said analyst Patrick Comack of 
Guzman & Co., the Registry “is just an incremental hit on top of everything else that’s 
slamming the long-distance industry,” including increased competition from wireless 
providers and local exchange carriers.147  Additionally, WorldCom competitors AT&T 
and Sprint both have said that the Registry has not adversely affected their telemarketing 
businesses; indeed, AT&T receives 10 million inbound calls a month and continues to 
make millions of outbound calls monthly.148  In short, telemarketers may be eager to 
blame economic losses on the Registry, but businesses in any industry often counter the 
threat of any new regulation with the layoffs-and-losses argument.  The “threat of 
massive job loss is standard rhetoric when a business model is threatened.”149 
¶59 Moreover, prior to the national Registry, the majority of the states had their own 
do-not-call lists, and “the world did not end in those states.”150  Accordingly, some 
analysts are “highly skeptical of doomsday job loss predictions” and the “worst-case 
scenario” estimates.151  Rather, analysts predict that telemarketers will adapt their 
business models and develop new techniques or mechanisms for obtaining customers.152  
If regulations prohibit telemarketers from making unsolicited sales calls to wireless 
 
140 Id.  
141 Lisa Bertagnoli, Business: No Calls, No Work, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 5, 2003, at 5. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228, 1241 (10th Cir. 2004). 





149 Glen Kaltenbrun, Editorial: Telemarketing Advocacy Just Doesn’t Ring True, LOS ANGELES TIMES, 
Oct. 8, 2003, at B12. 
150 Interview with Anthony Chan, Chief Economist, Banc One Investment Advisors, National Public 
Radio: All Things Considered (Oct. 8, 2003). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
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devices, businesses will find other ways to reach potential consumers.  Just as businesses 
have learned to exploit new technologies, telemarketers will learn to navigate the new 
regulatory environment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶60 Protecting the privacy interests of wireless device users who do not wish to pay for 
sales calls necessitates protective measures in addition to the Registry.  As the FTC 
states, “It is particularly important to allow consumers an option to reduce unwanted 
telemarketing calls to cellular phones and pagers.”153  The Registry alone does not offer 
consumers enough protection from unwanted sales calls.  Wireless consumers who have 
listed their numbers in the Registry can still expect to receive a number of unwanted calls 
from various organizations.154  As noted previously, Congress, the FCC and the FTC have 
been reluctant to limit solicitations from charitable organizations, and neither the TSR 
nor the TCPA extend to calls made for market or survey research, or for political or 
religious purposes.155  However, the revised TCPA and the TSR, as well as the recent 
congressional mandates, make it quite apparent that Congress, the FCC, and the FTC156 
all recognize the urgent need to provide consumers with options to limit some forms of 
telemarketing sales calls. 
¶61 By precluding telemarketers from using the EBR exemption in the wireless context, 
substantial government interests are advanced.  Even the telemarketers in FTC v. 
Mainstream Marketing Services did not dispute the substantial government interest in 
“preventing abusive practices and protecting residential privacy.”157 
¶62 The justifications and arguments for these protective measures are similar to those 
put forth in the context of faxed advertisements.  Although the FCC has effectively 
stayed its revisions to the EBR exemption for faxed advertisements,158 the revised rules 
are crucial in the wireless environment.  Here, unsolicited sales calls to mobile numbers 
pose unique safety concerns in addition to the general inconvenience and cost burden.  
Moreover, an unsolicited sales call from a party with whom the customer has an 
established business relationship is not necessarily any more welcome than an unsolicited 
sales call from an unknown party.  
¶63 Furthermore, any argument that precluding the use of the EBR exemption for calls 
to wireless devices would chill speech is “circumvented by . . . [the provision for 
 
153 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 C.F.R. at 4632. 
154 Anticipating that consumer confusion will ensue after consumers list their phone numbers in the 
Registry but still receive unwanted sales calls, both the FTC and the FCC have emphasized that the 
Registry will not stop all telemarketing calls.  See, e.g., You Make the Call, supra note 71, at 2; Federal 
Communications Commission, National Do-Not-Call Registry, at http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/donotcall/ (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2004). 
155 FCC Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14040. 
156 On February 13, 2004 the FTC proposed to amend the TSR to require telemarketers to reconcile their 
calling lists with the Registry every month, as opposed to every quarter.  Direct Marketing Association, 
FTC Officially Proposes Monthly Do-Not-Call Scrubs (Feb. 13, 2004), at http://www.the-
dma.org/cgi/dispnewsstand?article=1849 (last visited Feb. 13, 2004).  This means that telemarketers would 
have only a month, rather than three months, to remove from their calling lists any new phone numbers 
added to the Registry. 
157 FTC v. Mainstream Marketing Services, 345 F.3d at 854. 
158 See generally FCC Order, 2003 FCC Lexis 5369. 
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obtaining] the consent of the receiving party.”159  This provision reduces cost-shifting and 
withstands constitutional challenges.160  Far from chilling speech, the new telemarketing 
regulations ensure that telemarketers may still reach consumers who do not mind 
receiving sales calls.   
¶64 Consumers pay for wireless service for their personal convenience, not the 
convenience of telemarketers.  Should telemarketers have the option to make sales calls 
to wireless devices? Ultimately, each consumer should have the ability to make that call. 
 
159 Michael D. McConathy, Destination Ventures, LTD. v. FCC and Moser v.FCC: How Much Should 
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act Restrict Your Phone, Fax and Computer? 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. 
REV. 153, 178 (1996).  However, McConathy considers acceptable both express consent and “implied 
consent through prior dealings or an existing business relationship.”  Id. 
160 Id. 
